T he treatm ent o f deduction is n o t dissim ilar,4 b u t it is lo n g er, ru n n in g a fu ll tw enty-one sections (1.57-77). It, to o , d iv id es in to p arts.
1. A n in itial statem ent concerning the p rocedure o f d ed u ctio n (1.57) 2. R eport o f com peting analyses: one in to fiv e p a rts and an o th er in to three; the analysis in to fiv e p arts is set o u t in a lengthy exam ple concerning the adm inistration o f the u niverse (1.57-60) 1 A ll scholars agree that On Invention is an early work o f C icero's, but how early is not certain. Kennedy (1972) p. 107-10 suggests that it was w ritten between 91 and 89 B.C., when Cicero was fifteen to seventeen years old. Achard p. 5-10 argues for 84-3 B.C. and K roll (1940) col. 1093 thinks the work may have been w ritten as late as 80 B.C. For the purposes o f this paper, it is not necessary to decide betw een these dates.
2 Strictly speaking 1.50 is a transitional section in which Cicero refers both to w hat has been said concerning the discovery ( invenire, inventio) o f arguments from various sources o r topics (ex his locis) and to w hat w ill be said concerning the ways in which arguments are advanced.
3 In dividing the treatm ents o f induction and deduction into parts, I am not suggesting that no other divisions are possible. Rather I offer divisions which are based on the text and suit the purposes o f this paper.
4 Several sim ilarities between the treatm ent o f induction and that o f deduction are clear from the outlines. Each begins with a statement concerning the procedure under discussion (Ind. no. 1, Ded. no. 1). Philosophic predecessors are m entioned: Socrates for induction and Aristotle and Theophrastus for deduction (Ind. no. 3, Ded. no. 3). There is discussion o f the number o f parts into which each procedure divides (Ind. no. 5, Ded. no. 2-4). Each procedure is elucidated by examples; Epaminondas appears within an example in both treatm ents (Ind. no. 2 and 6, Ded. no. 2 and 5). 3. E ndorsem ent o f the fiv e p a rt analysis: it has been ad o p ted by all w ho take th eir start from A risto tle and T heophrastus; a d etailed argum ent in support o f q u in q u ep aitite an aly sis (1 .6 1 -6 ) 4. Sum m ary overview o f the fiv e p arts (1.67) 5. E xam ples o f argum ents having d ifferen t num bers o f p a rts: not only five and four p arts-exam ples based on the trial o f E pam inondas-but also three-an exam ple concerning th e destruction o f C arthage-and even tw o and one-exam ples based on th e w om an w ho has given b irth -(1.67-75) 6. C onsideration o f th e w ay an argum ent is han d led , esp ecially v ariatio n in th e o rd er o f prem ises (L 7 5 -6 ) 7. R ecognition th a t p h ilosophers o ffe r m any o th e r an aly ses, follow ed by the claim to have w ritten about argum ent in o rato ry m ore accurately and diligently than o th ers (1.77)
In the course o f th is paper, I shall say som e things ab o u t C ic ero 's discussion o f induction, but m y prim ary concern w ill be w ith h is acco u n t o f deduction. In particular, I w ant to call attention to C ic ero 's argum ent fo r a q u in q u ep aitite analysis o f deductive reaso n in g (D ed. 3). It is rem ark ab le in th a t it m akes elaborate use o f th e m ixed hypothetical syllogism , an d also o f som e im portance in th at it supplem ents o u r evidence fo r early P erip atetic in te re st in syllogism s o f th is la n d . R ecen t scholarship o n th e h isto ry o f ancient logic has generally focused on la ter sources-like A lex an d er o f A ph ro d isias, B oethius, P hiloponus and S im plicius5-and p o in te d to T heophrastus as a significant con trib u to r to th e developm ent o f hypothetical sy llo g istic.6 C icero, w riting th ree cen tu ries b efo re A lexander, seem s not only to confirm the im portance o f T heophrastus b u t also to in d icate th at his contributions w ere recognized as such by H ellen istic rh eto rician s. In presenting this thesis, I shall n o t be accepting C icero 's claim to have w ritten m ore accurately and diligently than o thers (D ed. 7), but I w ill suggest th at the argum ent in fav o r o f q uinquepaitite analysis (D ed. 3) is m ore coherent than w hat precedes (Ded. 2) and that this d ifference is larg ely attributable to C ic ero 's use o f sources. Π T he discussion o f induction begins (Ind. 1) w ith a b rie f statem ent concerning the procedure. It is said to be "an argum ent w hich, through m atters n o t in doubt, gains the assent o f the person w ith w hom one is arguing; and by this assent it w ins his approval o f a certain doubful m atter because o f a sim ilarity to those m atters to w hich he has assen ted " (1 .5 1).7 T he fundam ental idea here is n o t in doubt: by adducing p arallel cases w hich are differen t but sim ilar, we estab lish th e truth o f w hatever concerns us.8 3 F o r th e sake o f clarity , C icero fo llo w s th is statem en t w ith an e x am p le (Ind. 2 ), in w hich Socrates rep o rts a co n v erstad o n betw een A sp asia o n th e one h and an d X enophon and h is w ife o n th e o th er.9 A sp asia firs t g ets X eno p h o n 's w ife to agree th a t sh e w o u ld p re fe r h e r n e ig h b o r's jew elry , clo th in g an d o th e r finery, should th ey b e b e tte r th an h e r ow n , an d then asks w hether she w ould p re fe r h e r n eig h b o r's h usband, sh o u ld h e be a b etter m an th an h e r ow n husband. X en o p h o n 's w ife re sp o n d s b y b lu sh in g , fo r she understands th at h e r e arlier adm issions co n stitu te an in d u ctiv e argum ent lead in g to the conclusion th at she w ould p re fe r h e r n e ig h b o r's husband, should he, lik e the o th er item s, prove b etter. A sp asia th en p u ts sim ilar questions to X enophon w ith the sam e re su lt. She co n clu d es th a t b oth husband and w ife w ant th e v ery b e st spouse. U n less th e y can b rin g it ab o u t th at no b ette r spouses exists in the w orld, they w ill alw ay s feel th e lack o f those they thin k b e st (1.51-2).
T he exam ple is clear and w ell illu strates w hat the in itial statem ent concerning induction is intended to convey: through sim ilar cases one establishes a d ifferen t and do u b tfu l m atter. I o ffe r o n ly tw o com m ents. F irst, the exam ple helps us understand a d etail in th e in itia l statem ent. I am referrin g to the use o f the sin g u lar in referen ce to the p erso n w ith w hom one is a rg u in g .10 T he sin g u lar suggests th a t the statem en t is o rien ted m ore tow ard d ialectic than public oratory, and th at im pression is confirm ed by the exam ple o f A spasia questioning first X en o p h o n 's w ife an d th en X enophon h im self.11 Second, th is o rien tatio n to w ard d ialectic fits th e subsequent list o f p recepts (Ind. 4): m ost especially th e th ird p re c ep t w h ich w arns against d isclosing w here o n e 's q uestions are lead in g , and th e fo u rth p recep t concerning p o ssib le m oves, should th e resp o n d en t den y o r re fu se to an sw er die fin al question (1.54). Such recom m endations co n cern w in n in g strategy and ap p ear aim ed a t classroom e x ercises. T hey are n o t, h ow ever, d irectly relev an t to the logical structure o f ind u ctiv e a rg u m e n t T h at structure is unaffected by prem ature d isclosure an d obstinance o n th e p a rt o f the resp o n d en t.
T he account o f deduction, lik e th a t o f induction, o p en s w ith a statem ent o f the procedure (D ed. 1): D eduction is said to be uan argum ent w hich draw s som ething probable from th e m atter itse lf, an d w hen th is is set fo rth and exam ined in itse lf, it confirm s its e lf by its ow n fo rce and reaso n in g" (1 .5 7 ).12 T his statem ent is in ten d ed to estab lish a c o n tra st w ith induction. A deductive argum ent, unlike an in d u ctiv e one, d o es n o t adduce sim ilar b u t d ifferen t cases; rath er it draw s a con clu sio n "from th e m a tte r itse lf." 13 W hat C icero m eans by "from th e m atter its e lf ' is c le a r from e a rlie r rem ark s w ithin th e d iscu ssio n o f p ro o f, i.e " fro m w h at C icero say s co n cern in g th e discovery o f argum ents (1.3 4 -4 3 )14 a n d th e ir c lassificatio n as e ith e r necessary o r probable (1.44-50). A n arg u m en t lik e "I f she h a s g iven birth , she has la in w ith a m an" (1.44) is based,on cau se an d effe ct (1.37), an d one lik e "I f I w as abroad w hen th e m urder occurred, I d id n o t com m it th e m urder" (1.45) is based on th e lo catio n o f the a c t in q u estio n (1.38). In each o f these exam ples, th e argum ent is com pleted b y assum ing (o r estab lish in g ) tiie truth o f the antecedent: "In fact she has given b irth " and " In fa c t I w as abroad." In n eith er is p ro o f accom plished by adducing sim ilar cases. The tw o exam ples re c u r w ithin th e d iscu ssio n o f d ed u ctio n (1 .7 2 ,7 4 an d 1.63 respectively) and are typical o f the deductive argum ents u n d er d iscussion by C icero. F orm ally they are m ixed h ypothetical syllogism s o f th e if-th en variety: "I f P , then Q ; b u t P ; th erefo re Q ." 15 I shall have m ore to say about such syllogism s b efore concluding this p a rt o f m y paper, but first I w ant to call attention to th e fact th a t th e in itial statem ent concerning deduction is not im m ediately follow ed by an exam ple, as is the case w ith induction. Instead, C icero speaks o f a co ntroversy betw een those w ho advocate a q uinquepartite analysis o f deduction and those w ho p re fe r a trip artite analysis. W e are to ld th a t the disp u te does n o t concern the actual practice o f orato ry but rath e r how precepts o ught to be giv en .16 T h at sounds like a p ractical m atter in w hich pedagogical m ethod is the focus o f controversy, but C icero q uickly in d icates th at it is also (o r has becom e) a conceptual issue: W hile the one party says th at there are five parts, the o th e r holds th at it is n o t p o ssib le to divide deduction in to m ore than three p a rts? 17 C icero tells us th at he is going to set o u t th e controversy along w ith th e reasoning on b o th sides, b u t w hat fo llo w s is n o t as inform ative as m ight be hoped for. F irst, w e g et an exam ple o f quinquepartite deduction w ithout any statem ent concerning th e reasons fo r p referring fiv e parts (1.58-9). A fter th a t com es a statem en t o f th e reasons fo r p referrin g three p arts, b u t n o exam ple is o ffere d (1.60).
T here is an im balance here w hich m ay be ex p lain ed in p a rt by C icero 's youth. T he w ork O n In ven tio n is a ju v e n ile effo rt, so th a t in fe licites a re to be expected. T hat is true enough, b u t it m ay n o t be th e w hole story. A s I see it, C icero has deliberately om itted the reasoning o f those advocating fiv e p arts, because he w ants to p resen t th e ir reaso n s as h is ow n; and th a t is in fa c t w hat happens. A fter com pleting h is rep o rt concerning com peting analyses (D ed. 2 ), C icero m akes, as it w ere, a new start (D ed. 3), first stating his preference fo r five p arts and then saying th at he m u st explain this preference (1.61).18 W hat follow s is a w ell stru ctu red argum ent in ten d ed to 15 There are, of course, other kinds o f m ixed hypothetical syllogism s. In Part IV o f this paper, I shall have occasion to consider the "separative" variety.
1 6 1.57 paululum in praecipiendi ratione dissenserunt. 17 1.57 nam partim quinqué eius partes esse dixerunt, partim non plus quam in tres partes posse distribuí putaverunt. 18 1.61 quare autem nobis ilia magis partitio probe tur, dicendum vide tur, ne temere secuti putemur; et breviter dicendum, ne in huiusmodi rebus diutius, quam ratio praecipiendi postulat, commoremur. "It seems necessary to say why I approve more of that (five part) division, lest I be thought to adopt it recklessly. And I m ust speak briefly, lest in m atters o f this kind I delay longer than is called for by the m ethod o f giving rules." In fairness to Cicero, it may obsevered that these words do not explicitly rule out presenting an argument already advanced by others. But if Cicero is carefully choosing his words, then he is being coy. For what is said allow s us to believe-or more strongly, encourages us to believe--that he will speak for him self and on his own. And that is certainly an impression which Cicero would welcome. Cf. 1.50, where Cicero speaks of the negligence o f those who write Artes; 1.77, where he claim s to have written more dem onstrate not only the p o ssib ility o f a fiv e p a rt analysis b u t also the w rongness o f three p a rt an aly sis.19 T h a t is ex actly w h at w e e x p ec t to find, b u t do n o t find, in C icero 's re p o rt o f com peting an aly ses. I sh all say m ore about the argum ent fo r fiv e p arts in P a rt ΠΙ o f th is p ap er. F o r th e m om ent, I w ant to stay w ith C icero's in d a l treatm ent o f the q u in q u ep artite analysis.
In stead o f repo rtin g th e reaso n in g o f th o se w ho adv o cate fiv e p arts, C icero lists the parts they recognize to g eth er w ith an illu strativ e argum ent concerning th e o rd er o f th e un iv erse (1.58-9). T he ad v o cates are re fe rre d to each tim e a p a rt is introduced (" they say ," "they th in k ," e tc .), and the num ber o f parts is em phasized by counting: "first," "th en ," " in th e th ird p a rt," "in the fourth p lace" and "in th e fifth p lace." T h a t gives an appearance o f o rd er to C icero's rem arks, b u t it can n o t co n ceal certain d ifficu lties. I m ention three, o f w hich the first tw o are clo sely related .
F irst, the technical term s by w hich th e p a rts are know n are n o t form ally introduced. R ather they becom e c lea r in th e co u rse o f th e discu ssio n : th e first prem ise is called the proposition th e p ro o f o f th is prem ise is th e p ro p o sitio n is approbation th e second prem ise is th e assum ption its p ro o f is the assum ptionis approbation and th e conclusion is th e com plexio. A t risk y o f being fussy, I w ant to p o in t o u t th a t u sin g tech n ical term s b efo re d efin in g o r explaining them m ay be con fu sin g .20 C o n sid er p ro p o sitio . T h e term d oes n o t occu r w here one expects to fin d it: i.e . a t th e v ery o u tset w hen th e first prem ise is introduced (1.58). Instead, it m akes its appearance la te r w hen the assum ptio is introduced ( 1.59). T h at w ill create no d ifficu lty fo r the educated reader, b u t the ty ro m ay be p u zzled .21 carefully and diligently than others; and 2.8, where he speaks o f making contributions on his own (ex nostro). There may well be contributions by Cicero (see Achard p. 25-6); I am, however, suggesting that the argum ent o f 1.62-6 is not one.
19 Cf. 1.63 sin autem ita est,falsum est non esse p lus quant tripertitam argumentationem; "But if that is so, it is false that there is no argum ent o f more than three parts." Both Hubei p. 107 and Achard p. 111 introduce (im )possibility into their translations: "And if this is so, it is untrue that an argum ent can have no more than three parts" and "Mais, s 'il en est ainsi, il est faux de dire que l'argumentation ne peut comporter plus de trois parties." W hether or not esse here im plies possibility, the translations correctly reflect the position taken by the advocates o f tripartite analysis. See note 17.
20 The author o f the Rhetoric to H erennius, probably Com ificius, does better than Cicero in that he begins his discussion o f five part argum entation with a list o f the parts followed by a brief explanation o f each (2.28). The illustrative argum ent comes later (2.28-30). It may be that Cicero's source was organized in a sim ilar way, and that Cicero moved the overview of parts to its present position (Ded. 4 = 1.67) when he took over the argument for five parts and made it his own (as I believe he did). But having said that, I do not want to suggest that the Rhetoric to Herennius is in other respects useful for interpreting On Invention, In particular, the five parts set forth are not the same as those found in On Invention, and attempts to relate them m ust fail (pace M atthes p. 206). Clearest is the fourth part, exornatio. It is said to be used for the sake o f adornment and enrichment, once the argument has been established (2.28). That hardly fits On Invention, for there each of the parts is conceived o f as a step in the argum ent None is recommended for use after the argument has been completed.
21 The Kneales p. 177-8 tell us that "Cicero did a useful service by inventing Latin equivalents for Greek technical terms." As an example, they cite propositio and refer to 1.57ff. That may be correct, but the fact that propositio occurs first in 1.59 and without explanation suggests to me that it was already a terminus technicus, at least in Cicero's "classroom." It is used more form ally in 1.67, but there Cicero has concluded the argument for quinquepartite analysis and is surveying the resulting five parts. He appears to be following his source and/or teacher closely and not introducing new terms.
Second, w hen the first o f the fiv e p arts is introduced, it is d escrib ed sim ply as th e " the sum m it (sum m a) o f th e argum ent" (1 .5 8 );22 and w hen the th ird p a rt is introduced, w e are to ld " to add it fro m th e fo rce o f the p ro p o sitio (ex v i p r o p o sitio n s )" (1 .5 9 ).23 A g ain , th e b e g in n er m ay be puzzled. W e can, how ever, fin d clarificatio n in th e la te
T hird and last, the advocates o f fiv e p arts are said to th in k th a t th e first prem ise o f a deductive argum ent should be proven " by a v arie ty o f reaso n s and w ith the greatest p o ssib le fu lln ess o f ex p ressio n ."29 In a rh eto rical 22 1.58 aiunt primum convenire exponere summam argumenationis. 23 1.59 aiunt, quod ostendere velis, id ex vi propositionis oportere assumere. 24 1.67 propositio, p er quam locus is breviter exponitur ex quo vis omnis oportet entartet ratiocihationis. I have translated locus here with "source" in order to strengthen the connection with ex quo: "from which" flows the force o f the argum ent Alternatively, "topic" m ight be preferred, since it may rem ind us of the earlier survey o f loci in 1.34-43. We are to search through the loci in order to find an argum ent after which the argument is fleshed out by stating the second prem ise, the assw nptio, and the conclusion. 25 1.67 asswnptio, per quam id, quod ex p ro p o sitio n ad ostendum perinet, assumitur 26 In the categorical syllogism , the m ajor prem ise does not contain the entire force (omnis vis) o f the argument. Two premises including a middle term are needed before the power o f the argument is revealed.
27 See Prantl vol. 1 p. 383-5 on μ εταλα μ β ά νειν and μετάληψ ις. 28 For an interesting attem pt to elucidate Cicero's argum ent by introducing modem notation, see Schweinfurth-W alla p. 158. She correctly observes that Cicero has given little thought to the logic o f the illustrative example. His concern is with the number of parts. The same can be said o f the later (1.68-9) example o f quinquepartite deduction (i.e., the first illustrative argument in Ded. 5). It is based on the w ell known trial of Epaminondas (stock material: see the exam ple o f induction in 1.55-6 = Ind. 6, as well as that o f four part deduction in 1.70) and satisfies the earlier call for fullness o f expression in the propositionis approbatio (1.68 satisfying the recommendation o f 1.58, on which see the next paragraph). Nevertheless, Cicero seems quite unconcerned with logical clarity. The propositio (1.68) needs to be reform ulated, and the asswnptio (1.69) is so unclear that scholars disagree where it is stated in the argum ent (see Kroll p. 4 and Achard p. 114 n.181 versus Schweinfurth-W alla p. 159-60, with whom I agree). My point is not that Cicero's argument is hopelessly confused. It is rather that Cicero is not interested in logical structure. He is more concerned with elaborating the approbations, thereby emphasizing those parts which turn a three part argum ent into one of five parts. See Klein col. 1253-4.co n tex t such a recom m endation m ay be in place. In fact, it m ay be th ought to p ic k up an d underline an e arlier rem ark in C ic e ro 's d iscu ssio n o f proof: "T he em bellishm ent o f an argum ent, once it h as been d isco v ered , an d th e dividing o f it in to d efin ite p arts are (tasks) m ost ag reeable (to th e audience) an d esp ecially necessary" (1.50).30 B u t h av in g said th a t, I w an t to u n d erlin e its irrelevance w ithin th e p articu lar c o n te x t T he recom m endation throw s no lig h t o n the logical structure o f the illu strativ e argum ent, an d h as no d irect relatio n sh ip to th e question a t issu e: fiv e p arts a s a g ain st th ree. In d eed , an advocate o f fiv e p arts m ight w ell re je c t fu lln ess o f ex p ressio n in fa v o r o f brevity, o r claim th at eith e r one m ay be desirab le d epending o n the situ a tio n .31 ΙΠ A fte r rep o rtin g the com peting analyses (D ed. 2 ), C icero com bines h istory and personal p reference (D ed. 3 ) . H e d eclares h im se lf in fa v o r o f the quinquepartite analysis and te lls us th a t th is analysis h a s been adopted by those w ho follow A risto tle an d T heophrastus. H e ad d s th a t h is preference m ust be explained, le st he be th o u g h t h asty in o p tin g fo r fiv e p arts (1.61). W hat follow s is an ex p lan atio n o r arg u m en t in th ree steps (L 6 2 -6 ), w hose m o st strik in g featu re is th e u se o f m ix ed h y p o th etical syllogism s o f the if-th en variety.
Steps I (1.62-3) and Π (1.64-5) o f C icero 's ex p lan atio n a re n o t o n ly elaborate m ixed hypothetical syllogism s, b u t each o f th e step s also introduces a shorter hypothetical syllogism in o rd e r to illu stra te an obvious prem ise w hich needs no proof: i.e ., it needs n o approbation In both th e lo n g er and shorter syllogism s, th e m ajo r div isio n s are c learly indicated: "i f ' (si) introduces the p ro p o sitio ; "but" (autem ) m arks th e assumption and " therefore" (igitu r) signals the c o m p le x io 32 H ere are S tep s I an d Π in o u tlin e .
Step I = In v . 1.62-3 P ro p o sitio : I f 1) in som e arg u m en t th e p ro p o sitio is su ffic ie n t w ithout an approbatio and 2) in ano th er it is w eak u nless an approbatio is added, then the approbatio is separate from the p ro p o sitio .
3 0 1.50 inventant (sc.argum entationem ) exornan et certas in partes distinguí e t suavissimum est e t summe necessarium. The rem ark is part o f a transitional passage, on which see above, note 2. The adjective suavissimum refers to the pleasure provided to the listener, see Achard p. 102 n. 152.
31 L a t» in the discussion o f refutation (1.89), Cicero takes account o f the fact that orators may use many words to prove the propositio (deinde hoc approbant plurim is verbis), because they think that many words produce forgetfulness. The example takes the form o f a mixed hypothetical syllogism: "I f the inheritance was coming to him , it is probable that he committed the murder; But the inheritance was coming to him; Therefore he comm itted the murder." Many words cause the listen»* to forget that the consequent in the hypothetical premise was expressed as probable.
32 In Step I, the first statem ent o f the com plexio has igitur (1.62). W hen the complexio is restated, igitur is replaced by ex hoc et ex eo (1.63). In Step II, igitur occurs in both statem ents o f the complexio (1 .6 4 ,6 5 ). In neither o f the shorter syllogism s is the complexio expressed, for it is not in doubt and not directly relevant to the point at issue: namely, the obviousness o f one o f the prem ises. Step II = In v. 1.64-5 P ropositio : I f 1) in som e argum ent th e a ssu m p tio is su ffic ie n t w ithout an approbatio and 2) in another it is w eak unless an approbatio is added, then the approbatio is separate from the a ssu m p tio .
P r o p o s itio n s a p p ro ba tió :

[ P r o p o s itio n s a p p ro b a tio : o m itte d 34]
A ssu m p tio : B ut 1) th ere is som e arg u m en t in w h ich th e a ssu m p tio does n o t need an approbatio, an d 2) there is an o th er in w hich the assum ptio lacks force in th e absence o f an approbatio.
A s s u m p tio n s a p p ro b a tio [p o stp o n ed u n til a fte r th e c o m p le x io
is stated]: 1) A n assum ptio w hich is o bvious d o es n o t n eed an approbation e.g ., the assum ptio in the fo llo w in g argum ent:
P ro p o sitio : I f one o u g h t to w ish to be w ise, it is fittin g to study p h ilosophy.
A ssu m p tio : B u t o n e o u g h t to w ish to be w ise.
[C om plexio: T h erefo re it is fittin g to stu d y p h ilo so p h y .35] and 2) it is obvious th at som e assum ptio needs on approbatio. C o m p lexio [stated b efo re an d again a fte r th e a s s u m p tio n s approbatio]: T herefore the approbatio is separate from the assum ptio.
In co n trast w ith Steps I and Π, S tep ΠΙ (1.66) d o es n o t hav e a neatly articulated hypothetical form . T he opening w ords, "A nd from th ese (argum ents) the follow ing is obv io u s," 36 indicate dependence o n the preceding tw o Steps; and w hat com es n ex t, " th at th ere is som e argum ent in w hich neith er the p ro p o sitio n o r th e assum ptio needs an approbation ' com bines p arts o f th e a s s u m p tio n s o f Steps I and II. In p a rticu lar, it 9 com bines th e first p a rt o f th e tw o a ssw n p tio n es. T h e co n clu sio n , intro d u ced by "from w hich it is recognized,"37 3 8 is c le a r an d in lin e w ith Steps I an d Π: "T he approbatio is contained in n eith er the p ro p o sitio n o r th e a ssu m p tio n B y draw ing fu rth er on Steps I and II, w e easily o b tain th e fo llo w in g hypothetical argum ent.
Step Π Ι = In v .
P ro p o sitio : I f w isd o m is to be so u g h t ab o v e a ll, fo lly is to be avoided above all.
A ssu m p tio : B u t w isd o m is to be so u g h t ab o v e all. C o m p lexio : T h erefo re fo lly is to b e a v o id ed ab o v e a ll.
[and 2) it is obvious th at th ere is an o th er in w hich th e p ro p o sitio and the assw nptio lack force in th e absence o f an approbatio.41] C om plexio: F ro m w hich it is reco g n ized th a t th e a p p ro b a tio is contained in n eith er the p ro p o sitio n o r th e a ssw n p tio .
H aving com pleted
Step ΙΠ o f h is argum ent in fa v o r o f a quinquepartite analysis o f deductiv e reaso n in g , C icero , a t th e en d o f 1.66, states by w ay o f conclusion: "A nd if th is is so, those w ho have d iv id ed argum entation in to five p arts have divided in a suitable m anner." T he w ording o f th is conclusion echoes C icero's in itial endorsem ent o f th e quinquepartite d iv ision in 1.61.42 "T hose" in 1.66 has th e sam e re feren ce as " a ll w ho tak e th e ir start from A ristotle and T heophrastus" in 1.61. A pparently C icero believes that the quinquepartite analysis goes back in som e im p o rtan t w ay to the early P eripatos. T he correctness o f th a t b e lie f w ill be d iscu ssed in P a rt IV o f th is paper. F o r the m om ent, I w an t to u n d erlin e th a t C icero h as been not only using m ixed hypothetical argum ents to defend the fiv e p art 37 1.66 ex quo cognoscitur. 38 The propositio is not stated, but it is easily supplied by com bining the propositiones of Steps I and Π.
39 On the omission o f the p ro p o sitio n s approbatio, see note 34. 40 p art 2 o f the assumptio is not stated in Step III, presuam bly because it is considered obvious. See the assum ptions approbatio o f both Steps I and II. There it is said to be obvious that the proposito and the asswnptio sometimes need an approbatio.
41 Concerning the omission of part 2 o f the assum ptions approbation see the preceding note.
42 The wording at the end o f 1. d iv ision, b u t also defending a fiv e p a rt d iv isio n o f th is m ode o f argum ent. T hat is c lea r both from the th ree exam ples he gives, one in each o f th e th ree S teps,43 and fro m th e sum m ary o v e r v ie w^ p a rts, w h ich fo llo w s im m ediately (D ed. 4). I have already h ad occasion to re fe r to th is overview (above, P a rt H) and rep eat here w hat is significant. T he p ro p o sito is described as th at "from w hich the en tire force o f th e argum ent oug h t to flo w ," an d th e assw n p tio as th a t " through w hich one assum es w h at is p e rtin en t to show ing (o r proving the case), (deriv in g it) fro m th e p ro p o sitio n (1.67). T hat is characterization in term s o f h ypothetical syllogistic. T he conditional statem ent o f the p ro p o stio contains th e fo rce o f the argum ent,44 and the antecedent o f the conditional is adopted in th e assumption w here it is asserted categorically. IV C icero te lls us th a t quinquepartite analysis has been adopted b y a ll w ho take th e ir th e ir start from A risto tle an d T heophrastus. I f th e argum ent o f P art ΙΠ is sound, i t w ould seem th at th e an aly sis in q u estio n is a d iv isio n o f m ixed hypotheticals. C an th at be co rrect? T he S toics, a fte r all, are know n to have w orked extensively o n h y p o th etical sy llo g istic, and C icero is lik ely to have b een influenced by th e ir w ork. I d o n o t w an t to d en y th a t Stoic logic w as im portant in th e H ellenistic period; th e young C icero w ill have been exposed to it through his teachers. B ut g ranting th at, I w an t to c a ll atten tio n to the evidence fo r early P eripatetic w o rk on m ix ed h y p o th etical syllogism s. It is n o t insignificant; and taken to g eth er w ith p assag es in O n In ven tio n , it provides good reason to believe w hat C icero say s, a t le a st in re g a rd to T heophrastus. H ere is the m o st im p o rtan t evidence.
In 390.2-9 = 111E.4-12). P hiloponus te lls u s th a t len g th y tre a tises w ere w ritten on th e sub ject by T heophrastus, E udem us an d o th ers o f A risto tle 's p u p ils, a n d also by th e S toics {In A P r 242.18-21 = 111B .5-8 FH S & G ). T h at suggests a substantial d iscussion o f h ypothetical sy llo g istic b y both T heophrastus an d E udem us, b u t B oethius says th a t T h eo p h rastu s o n ly p ursued the c h ie f p o in ts o r elem ents o f th e su b ject, w hile E udem us fo llo w ed a broader p ath , b u t in such a w ay th a t h e seem s to have sow n the seed w ith o u t h arv estin g th e cro p {H yp. s y ll 1.1.3 = 111A .6-10 FH S & G ). W hat B oethius says m ay be taken to c a st d o u b t on Philoponus ' referen ce to lengthy treatises,45 b u t it seem s q u ite p o ssib le th at B oethius is e ith er 11 uninform ed o r disingenuous concerning th e w ork o f T h eo p h rastu s and E udem us.46 In any case, setting fo rth the elem ents o f h y p o th etical sy llogistic n eed not, and should n o t, be th o u g h t o f as c h ild 's p lay . W hat T heophrastus and Eudem us w rote, w h eth er com paratively b rie f o r lengthy as P hiloponus reports, w ill have co n stitu ted an im p o rtan t co n trib u tio n to die fie ld o f hypothetical syllogistic. It influenced the developm ent o f Stoic logic and w as taken up by rhetoricians w ho p laced them selves w ith in the P eripatetic tradition o r drew eclectically upon it. E ith er w ay, C icero w ill be rep o rtin g a co rrect tradition, w hen he speaks o f those " w ho tak e th e ir start from A risto tle and T heophrastus." N ot only does C icero m ake ex p licit referen ce to th e founders o f th e P eripatos, b u t also m uch o f w hat is said w ith in th e d iscu ssio n o f d eduction has p arallels in latte r rep o rts concerning T heophrastus. I sh all m ention fo u r parallels. F irst, w e know from A lex an d er th a t T h eo p h rastu s con cern ed h im self w ith hypothetical syllogism s in w hich e ith er th e co nditional prem ise o r th e additional prem ise is doubtful and th erefo re in n eed o f p ro o f (in A P r p. 263.11-25 = 1 12A .22-37 FH S & G ). T h a t is, o f co u rse, a m a jo r consideration in C icero's argum ent in fa v o r o f q u in q u ep artite deduction, especially in Steps I and Π (1.62-5). M oreover, A lex an d er te lls u s th a t th e additional assum ption m ay be p o sited through induction, o r h ypothetical argum ent, o r as obvious, o r th ro u g h a (categ o rical) sy llo g ism (p. 388.17-20 = 112B .1-3 FH S& G ). W e m ay com pare S tep Π o f th e arg u m en t fo r fiv e parts. H ere C icero asserts th at an a ssw n p tio w hich is o b v io u s need s no approbatio and then supports th e assertion by adducing a p articu lar exam ple in w hich the assum ptio, "B ut one o u g h t to w ish to be w ise," is said to be o b v io u s (1.65).
Second, A lexander rep o rts th at th e o ld e r m en, i.e. th e early P erip atetics, characterized the additional prem ise as μ ετα λ α μ β α ν ό μ ενο ν . I t is n o t p o sited " from outside" (ού εξω θεν); ra th e r it appears in th e co nditional prem ise, but n o t in the required form . T here it is p a rt o f a hy p o th etical and a sequence; it m ust be changed into an assertion w hen adopted as the additio n al prem ise (p. 263.26-36 = 112A .38-49 FH S& G ). T h e id e a is the sam e in the C iceronian description o f the assum ptio: it does n o t com e "from o u tsid e," but ra th e r "from the p ro p o sitio n (ex p ro p o sitio n s 1.67).
T hird, Sim plicius reports th at " since" (έπ εί) is used in stead o f "i f ' (ει) in hypothetical argum ents in w hich the antecedent is n o t o n ly tru e but also obvious and undisputed. W e arc also to ld th at th e y o u n g er m en, i.e. the S toics, call this kind o f proposition "p arasy n ap tic" an d th at T heophrastus, in his P rior A nalytics, m ade c lear th e reason fo r u sing " since" (In D e cáelo p. 552.31-553.4 = 112C .1-5 FH S& G ). C o n cern in g th e S to ics w e are w ell enough inform ed. They d istinguished betw een the synaptic conjunction, "if," w hich announces sequence, and the p arasy n ap tic co n ju n ctio n , " sin ce," w hich announces both sequence and fa c t (D iogenes L aertiu s 7 .7 1).47 In reg ard to T heophrastus w e are less w ell inform ed; b u t i f S im plicius has n o t m isrepresented him , he w ill have o ffered a reaso n fo r u sing " sin ce." Perhaps he em phasized econom y, p o in tin g o u t th at " sin ce" introduces the 14 o f sources. T he reasoning o f th e advocates o f fiv e p a rts-reaso n in g w hich w e m ight exp ect to occur as p a rt o f th e p reced in g re p o rt (D ed. 2)-h as been carefu lly reproduced u n d er th e guise o f C ic ero 's ow n ex p lan atio n fo r preferrin g q uinquepartite an aly sis (D ed. 3). B u t w h eth er o r n o t C icero is disingenious, h is explanation is evid en ce both fo r e arly P erip atetic w o rk on hypothetical syllogistic and fo r its influence am ong rh eto rician s o f th e H ellen istic period. . K e n n e d y , G . The A r t o f P ersu a sio n in G reece. P rin ceto n : P rin ceto n U n iv ersity P ress 1963. T he A r t o f R h etoric in the R om an W orld. P rinceton: P rin ceto n U n iv ersity P ress 1972. A N ew H isto ry o f C la ssica l R h eto ric. P rin ceto n : P rin ceto n U n iv ersity P ress 1994. K le in , J. "E p ich eirem ," in H isto risch es W örterbuch d e r R h e to rik , ed . G. 
